110 Chapter VI. 



sinuates this truth in answering a question he had put : 

 "Does a dog or monkey gather the concept of 'color 1 

 in general from the notions of the single colors, and 

 the notion of a bird from the memory images of vari- 

 ous feathered creatures? Or is it unable to do so? This 

 we do not know and probably never shall know." He 

 professes not to know whether higher animals have any 

 general concepts beyond abstractions of the first order; 

 but in that case it is inconsistent on his part to admit 

 any genuine abstractions in the psychic life of animals, 

 even those of the first order; for the latter necessarily 

 contain a general concept in the strictest acceptance of 

 the term. It is an essential element of every true com- 

 parison. If we cannot know whether a dog derives 

 the notion of color in general from the notions of the 

 single colors, then we do not know whether it forms 

 the general notion of "red" or "green" from the con- 

 crete manifestations of these colors in the objects of its 

 sense perceptions. 



But we are forced to take a step further. As abstrac- 

 tions of the first order in man essentially presuppose a 

 real power of abstraction, and as there are no reliable 

 manifestations of such a power in animals, we must con- 

 clude that animals have no intelligence. For, even an 

 abstractive power of the first order must manifest itself 

 in formal intellectual judgments, and this power of 

 inference must necessarily influence and show itself in 

 the activity of the animal. Consequently, if we find 

 no outward manifestations of such a power we are not 

 allowed to say : we knozv of no abstractive power in the 

 psychic life of animals, but must assert that animals 

 have none. 



