Intelligence and Speech. 113 



conjecture, but only show the existence of sentiency in 

 animals, not that of intelligence. We find it not only 

 probable but self-understood, that the cries of pain 

 uttered by any animal of a higher species and heard by 

 another of its own kind, cling to the sensile memory of 

 the latter animal, and are liable to become, as it were, 

 manifestations and signs of a psychic condition which 

 cannot be directly perceived by the senses. But such 

 signs have nothing to do with "intelligent determina- 

 tion" in animals, on which the use of calls and cries is 

 said "sometimes" and "probably" to depend. Once free 

 from the tyrannizing influence of the theory of evolu- 

 tion which postulates a priori the maintenance of such 

 probabilities, it is not difficult to realize that this con- 

 jecture is not only void of any solid foundation, but that 

 it is positively false. If the combination of these in- 

 articulate sounds with one another and with certain 

 sensile states of feeling and sense perceptions, were 

 really due to "intelligent determination," animals would 

 not only be endowed with something that could be com- 

 pared to human speech, but with speech itself. This 

 they do not possess, as Emery himself acknowledges. 



There exists a perfect parallelism, that is demanded 

 by nature, between the cognitive and appetitive powers 

 and their manifestation through signs which can be per- 

 ceived by the senses. This parallelism is as remarkable 

 in man as it is in the brute. In the stage of infancy, 

 and before all use of reason, the babe manifests its 

 psychic impressions and feelings by inarticulate sounds 

 of oain, joy, desire and pleasure. Even adults act in a 

 similar way, and in the first outburst of passion gen- 

 erally give inarticulate utterance to those vehement 



