118 Chapter VI. 



"I assert against Wasmann : 



1. "That it is very probable, though not proven, 

 that animals form general (abstract) notions from their 

 sense perceptions. And, as it is equally difficult to 

 prove the contrary, it is not admissible to draw a sharp 

 line of separation between man and animal on the 

 ground of such a premature judgment." 



2. "That in certain cases animals undoubtedly per- 

 form not only adaptive, but consciously adaptive ac- 

 tions." 



3. "That language, as the logical employment of 

 sense perceptible symbols for abstract concepts, is the 

 chief characteristic mark of human intelligence. By 

 language I understand the whole complex of those cere- 

 bral activities which cooperate in the formation and 

 employment of words and depend on definite cerebral 

 structures. Language is both the product of intelligence 

 and a means of furthering it." 



To these propositions I reply: 



We are not allowed to ascribe to animals higher 

 psychic functions than they evidently manifest. Now, 

 as even Emery himself admits, it is impossible to prove 

 that animals form general concepts from their sense 

 perceptions. The reason is, because all manifestations 

 of their psychic life can be satisfactorily explained 

 without this assumption. Therefore we are not forced 

 to attribute the power of abstraction to them. This is 

 not a "premature statement,"on the contrary, it is well 

 founded. The probability which Emery maintains for 

 the sake of suggesting the presence of such a power in 

 animals is without any foundation in facts, and the in- 

 terpretation of the examples which he enumerates (pp. 



