Intelligence and Speech. 119 



1 8 and 19) in support of his opinion, comes from his 

 error in taking general sense images for genuine ab- 

 stractions, a mistake which we have abundantly refuted. 

 Emery finds it very probable that a dog can perceive 

 the identity of color between the green-colored bench 

 and the bushes in the garden. But such a judgment 

 essentially presupposes an abstract notion of the ele- 

 mentary perception of "green." The dog undoubtedly 

 perceives the similarity of the two green colors, because 

 both of them produce a similar sense image in its sensile 

 imagination. But it is contrary to all scientific prob- 

 ability that it reflects on this similarity that it forms the 

 general concept "green" by abstraction, and uses that 

 idea for a formal judgment. Such suppositions are, to 

 say the least, improbable, because the similarity of the 

 respective sense images fully suffices to explain the 

 actual behavior of the dog. To ascribe anything more 

 to it is an arbitrary humanization of animals. Ants, 

 as is known, are endowed with well developed com- 

 pound eyes. They too perceive the similarity between 

 their own color and that of those guests which belong 

 to the so-called mimicry type. 1 For without this per- 

 ception the similarity of color could not accomplish its 

 biological purpose, which is to aid the guests and to be 

 of profit to them. Yet, who would conclude that ants 

 reflect on this resemblance and reason as follows: an 

 animal that is colored similarly to ourselves must either 

 bo of our species or, at least, be friendly towards us; 

 therefore let us favor those guests which are colored 

 similarly to ourselves? Emery will probably admit 



*) More particulars are given in our work: "Die psychischen 

 Faehigkeiten der Ameisen" ("Zoologica," Heft, 26), p. 41 ff. 



