120 Chapter VI. 



that it is an unjustifiable humanization of ants, to credit 

 them with the power of forming abstract notions and 

 of using these notions in acts of reasoning. But why, 

 then, ascribe this faculty to dogs? There is no more 

 reason for doing so than in the case of ants. We can 

 just as easily explain any biological facts connected with 

 dog life without this assumption. 



Moreover, Emery overlooked an important point in 

 our previous discussion; for we argued against the as- 

 sumption of general notions in animals not only nega- 

 tively, but from positive reasons. We did not only 

 show, that we are not forced to ascribe a power of ab- 

 straction to the dog, but that the employment of general 

 notions in its subsequent activity would necessarily im- 

 prove and develop its perceptive process, if it really 

 possessed the power of abstraction. But such an im- 

 provement is absolutely unknown. Consequently it is 

 wrong of Mr. Emery to call it inadmissible to argue a 

 sharp line of separation between man and brute on the 

 ground of the want of general notions on the part of the 

 animal. 



2. He asserted further "that in certain cases 

 animals undoubtedly perform not only adaptive, but con- 

 sciously adaptive actions." If "conscious adaptation" 

 is taken in the sense of formal consciousness which re- 

 sults from the abstract knowledge of the relation be- 

 tween means and end, then the proposition is apparently 

 false, because there is no power of abstraction in 

 animals. The examples he has adduced (p. 19) in 

 support of his assertion, prove absolutely nothing in 

 favor of such a conscious adaptation. We readily 

 admit that a dog scratches the door, because it wants 



