Intelligence and Speech. 121 



to come in ; and we likewise admit that, on finding the 

 pantry door shut, a cat tries to get in, if possible, by 

 some other known entrance, because she is allured by 

 the fascinating imagination of the dainties to be had in 

 that apartment. However, it would be wrong to infer 

 a formal, conscious adaptation in the animal from these 

 facts. They are fully explained by the working of the 

 sensile memory which combines in one whole the end 

 in view and the means to attain it, and thus directs the 

 activity of the animal to that end. The dog had often 

 made the experience, and at first merely by chance, 

 that a door gives way or opens when scratched by its 

 paws; likewise the cat had often made the experience 

 that dainties were to be found in a certain apartment 

 and that different ways led to that room. These ex- 

 amples contain nothing more than associations of several 

 sensitive phantasms which are the result of experience, 

 and the objects of which bear the same relation to one 

 another as means to an end. But this association of 

 phantasms is far from being "formal, conscious adap- 

 tation." The latter does not only include the concrete 

 connection between means and end, but the perception 

 of their abstract relation. The first of these two ele- 

 ments belongs to the sphere of sensitive instinct and is 

 contained in the association of phantasms to which we 

 have just referred; the latter belongs to the sphere of 

 intelligent life; the first we must ascribe to animals, 

 because it is necessary to explain their actions ; the latter 

 we must deny, because it would be an arbitrary human- 

 ization of the brute. The assumption of a formal, con- 

 scious adaptation in animals is not only not demanded, 

 but positively contradicted by facts. 



