Uniform Standard for Comparative Animal Psychology. 125 



In our "Vergleichende Studien ueber das Seelenle- 

 ben der Ameisen und hoeheren Thiere" we shall re- 

 turn to the special objections by which Smalian attempts 

 to invalidate some of our facts in disproof of ant intelli- 

 gence. For the present we restrict ourselves to a few 

 points of universal significance and to questions of 

 principle. 



Smalian thinks, as Forel did, that we require of ants 

 "ratiocinations similar to the human, which they, of 

 course, cannot make," and says : "In using the term in- 

 telligence, Wasmann seems constantly to think of a 

 degree of that power too high for beings which are so 

 widely different in organization from the highest ver- 

 tebrate. In my opinion, he demands too much of ant 

 intelligence." 



This objection is due to a misunderstanding. We 

 do not demand, nor have we ever demanded, that intelli- 

 gence in ants be equivalent in degree to that of man. 

 Still the essential characteristics of intelligence must 

 be met with, if the so-called intelligence of ants is to be 

 considered as intelligence at all. Our critics cannot 

 confute our doctrine by insinuating that we require a 

 degree of intelligence in ants equivalent to that of man. 

 Our only demand is that the term intelligence be not 

 trifled with in an arbitrary manner by designating as 

 intelligence what is no intelligence in its proper inter- 

 pretation. Both Forel and Smalian use the term in a 

 very loose and analogous sense, and what they call in- 

 telligence is not intelligence in its right meaning. We 

 all know that a resemblance or analogy is not the same 

 as a difference in degree. Still the modern theory of 

 evolution is very fond of passing off analogies for dif- 

 ferences in degree, in order to do away in the most 



