Uniform Standard for Comparative Animal Psychology. 137 



and the associate power of insects, as between the brain- 

 cortex and the associate power of vertebrates. And 

 thus, I think, the objections made against our argu- 

 mentation by modern brain-anatomists have been suffi- 

 ciently discussed and refuted. 



Consequently the comparative morphology and an- 

 atomy of the nervous system justify the application 

 of a uniform standard to the psychic activities of 

 articulate as well as 'of vertebrate animals. Even the 

 mere zoological standpoint permits us to exact almost 

 as much from the sensile cognition and appetite of ants, 

 as from the same faculties of dogs. And as modern 

 animal psychology terms this essentially sensitive asso- 

 ciative power the "intelligence" of animals, we are 

 equally entitled to apply the same critical standard to 

 the "intelligence" of ants and of higher mammals. 



But before we test this conclusion we must prevent 

 a misunderstanding which might arise from speaking 

 of the "unity of the sensitive consciousness in animals." 

 It is nothing unusual on the part of modern psychol- 

 ogists to identify sensitive consciousness with spiritual 

 self-consciousness and with consciousness of the end. 

 Yet, these two psychological concepts are entirely dif- 

 ferent, as will appear from the following analysis. 



Any sense perception, indeed any "perception," in- 

 cludes, as a secondary element, a cognition of the 

 impression which the object makes upon the sensitive 

 condition of the agent. We call this latter element 

 "apperception." These apperceptions are not unfre- 

 quently more vivid in animals than the perceptions 

 themselves. This arises from the fact, that the sub- 

 jective element generally predominates over the ob- 



