Uniform Standard for Comparative Animal Psychology. 139 



jective elements of sense perceptions. Intelligence alone 

 can thus discriminate. By virtue of his intelligence and 

 free will, man is able to free himself from the im- 

 pression which objects make upon him. His spiritual 

 nature enables him to disregard it. He is not forced 

 to follow the sensitive impressions of his good or bad 

 humor, and when he does, he acts unreasonably; he 

 follows the animal, not the human side of his nature. 

 Intelligence, and it alone, is able to discover the true 

 relations which exist between the object and the sub- 

 ject, and again between the subject and its activities, 

 and is able to reflect on them. It alone compares them, 

 one with the other, draws conclusions from them, and 

 is thereby raised to self-consciousness and adaptive 

 activity. Reason alone, this mental "introspection," 

 renders self -consciousness and consciousness of the end 

 possible. Hence man alone truly and properly appre- 

 hends himself as the uniform subject of his different 

 perceptions, affections and actions. The animal does 

 not; because it cannot reflect. It perceives the actual 

 unity of its sensitive nature only in as far as it experi- 

 ences by way of apperception the actual connection of 

 certain sensitive impulses with certain exterior sense 

 impressions. This connection determines the activity 

 of the animal with necessity; because the latter is un- 

 able to make it the object of intelligent reflection. 

 Pseudo-psychology, of course, regularly confounds the 

 sensitive consciousness of the animal with mental self- 

 consciousness and the consciousness of intention in hu- 

 man beings. However, this confusion hinders a clear 

 analysis of psychological phenomena, and must be dis- 

 carded as unscientific. These remarks may suffice to 



