154 Chapter Vlll. 



learning prove that the animal is able to form new 

 associations of representations from its own sense ex- 

 periences. This they do prove and nothing more. But 

 this ability results from sensile memory and not from 

 intelligence. And only the most uncritical confusion 

 of these two concepts can make it possible to propose 

 this second form of independent learning as a proof of 

 intelligence in animals. 



3. The third form of learning occurs, when a new 

 mode of action cannot possibly be explained unless we 

 admit personal conclusions from former experiences and 

 past conditions to the new state of affairs. This mode 

 of learning furnishes a real argument in favor of in- 

 telligence; for the second form with its new associations 

 of representations, which flow immediately from sensi- 

 tive experience, is totally inadequate to explain the 

 phenomenon. An additional and essentially higher 

 element cooperates. It is the intelligent comparison of 

 former conditions with the new state of affairs and the 

 conclusions which flow from this comparison. This 

 mode of learning necessarily implies the faculty of per- 

 ceiving the true relations between cause and effect, 

 between means and end. Consequently it presupposes 

 intelligence in the true and proper sense of the term. 

 Therefore we must examine very closely, whether 

 a form of learning which evidently implies an operation 

 of intellectual faculties, can be truly met with in ants 

 or in higher animals ; and it depends on the result of 

 this investigation, whether or not we may legitimately 

 call them intelligent. 



We have previously shown in many of our publica- 



