MENTAL COHERENCE 333 



have been led to refer thoughts to a mental world, and sense-impres- 

 sions to external objects as properties of them, or as caused directly 

 by them. Indeed the coherence and vividness of my sense-impres- 

 sions is my only ground for inferring the existence of a reality 

 which is beyond them, and which, as I suppose, they symbolize 

 for I do not think they can do more to my mind. So coherent 

 and capable of being tested in diverse ways is the story told by 

 sense-impressions, that nothing is more certainly true than the ex- 

 istence of the reality they insist on except that which is very much 

 more certain, the existence of the sense-impressions that tell the story. 



563. Evidently, as I say, my feelings have gained coherence 

 and meaning, and I have achieved such knowledge and skill in 

 thinking as I possess only because I have thought in the common- 

 sense way to which I have been driven, as it seems, by the very 

 constitution of my mind. Without that previous common-sense 

 thinking, my thoughts would now be infinitely more chaotic than 

 any that occur in my dreams. For, at least, in my dreams my 

 feelings do not constitute a meaningless procession. All of them are 

 grouped or linked together by being thought of as properties of, or as 

 caused directly or indirectly by, external objects. Even now, when 

 for an hour or more I have forced myself to think in idealist terms, 

 and have decided that I know nothing of what lies beyond my 

 feelings, yet, so strong is my tendency to think in a common-sense 

 way, that my wife and child have only to come into the room, and 

 the whole philosophic tangle is instantly dissipated. I return 

 forthwith to common sense. They become warm, living material 

 realities. Realities, too, become the room and all within it, the 

 house, the street, the whole universe. 



564. Now, if my feelings have gained coherence only because I 

 have draped groups of them about external objects, which I do not 

 know to be other than illusions, of what value is the coherence? 

 If the objects are illusions, the coherence is delusive. How am I 

 to know that my thinking is in any way better than the imaginings 

 of a madman (phenomenal to me), who, like me, depends on his 

 feelings, and is unlike me only in that he perceives some groups or 

 links together some groups differently? It would be absurd to 

 argue that my mind is normal and his abnormal. For the 

 thoroughgoing idealist there are no such things as mental nor- 

 mality and abnormality. He knows no more of other minds than 

 of material bodies. Indeed, the assumption that there are other 

 minds, normal or abnormal, is tantamount to a complete 

 abandonment of the whole idealist position. For if there are 



