HUME. 203 



existed, but more certainly the former than the latter, 

 because the former alone can be considered to leave 

 the proposition quite certain. Now, clearly this kind 

 of proof is inconceivable as to a Deity ; consequently 

 no man in this sense can be an atheist, if his under- 

 standing be sound. But we really mean by atheist as 

 contradistinguished from sceptic, one who holds that 

 there exists no evidence of a Deity, as contradistin- 

 guished from him who only entertains doubts on the 

 subject doubts whether there be evidence or no. 

 Mr. Hume's argument, if solid, shows that there is no 

 evidence, and not that there are doubts : consequently 

 the inference from his argument is, not that we have 

 reason for doubting whether or not there is proof, but 

 that we have no proof, and, therefore, if consistent 

 with ourselves, admitting his argument, we must not 

 believe; that is, we must disbelieve. In the ordinary 

 sense of the word, and as far as it is possible for the 

 thing to exist, this is atheism, not scepticism. On 

 miracles, no one has ever contended that the author's 

 doctrine amounted only to scepticism. He does not doubt 

 at all he denies, and not only denies negatively that 

 any miracle was ever proved by evidence, but affirms 

 positively that none ever can be so proved. His whole 

 argument goes to this ; and between the impossibility 

 of a miracle ever having been performed, and the total 

 want of evidence of a Deity by the light of nature, we 

 are left not to doubt, but to deny both providence and 

 a future state. The one argument shows supernatural 

 evidence to be impossible ; it shuts out light from 

 above : the other shows natural evidence to be non- 

 existent; it shuts out light from the world around 



