136 POLITICAL ECONOMY 



without reason assigned, on the simple condition that he found 

 a substitute who would work for the same pay during the un- 

 expired period of the contract, even should wages meanwhile 

 have risen. The plan could be worked with or without trade- 

 unions, but in all probability better with their assistance than 

 without it, as they could always readily find a substitute for a 

 man who was discharged, or who was anxious to leave his 

 employment. If the man did not belong to a trade-union he 

 might inform the gatekeeper of his shop that he desired a 

 substitute, and under the new system applicants for employment 

 would make it their first business to inquire whether any time- 

 labour berths were open, for what periods, and at what rates. 

 If the market-rate happened to be falling, the man who wished 

 to leave would have no difficulty. If the market was rising he 

 would have to supplement the payment made by the master, 

 paying a kind of smart money or premium to his substitute. 



Long engagements dating from a term-day would be objec- 

 tionable in most employments. Employers do not as a rule know 

 on any one day of the year how many men they will require for 

 that year, and moreover if all hands were free to leave on one 

 and the same day, the whole merit of the proposed system would 

 vanish. The labour-market could then no longer be watched 

 and each term-day would involve something very much like a 

 strike or a lock-out. If however men were engaged, as they 

 now are, from every day in the year, there would be no danger- 

 ous period of the year and no pressure put on any employer to 

 make up his mind on any one day as to the number of men he 

 might require. 



The greatest objection is perhaps the novelty of the plan, but 

 on consideration it will perhaps be found to be less novel than 

 it seems and the novelty, such as it is, might be adopted gradu- 

 ally and tentatively. 



After strikes, agreements are not uncommonly made, that 

 a given rate of wages shall last for a year or even two years. 

 This is a much more violent interference with general custom 

 than is now proposed. It implies that whatever number of 

 people are employed, wages are, for the given time, to remain 

 constant. This may be most inconvenient if the state of trade 

 alters. If trade becomes brisk, the employer is not sure to find 



