THE TIME-LABOUR SYSTEM 137 



his old, or average number of men at the covenanted rate, for his 

 workmen may emigrate to other towns. Again if trade be dull 

 the men are not sure of finding work ; they may be dismissed 

 one by one although their wages can not be lowered, and thus 

 by the attempt to enforce a constant rate when the labour- 

 market would give a varying rate, both parties suffer. If to 

 this it be answered that there is a tacit understanding in such 

 cases, that workmen are not to emigrate and that masters are 

 to employ the full number of hands, then I say this is the time- 

 labour system imperfectly developed ; imperfect in so far as it 

 does not allow the labour market to be watched, since the 

 engagements of all the hands end on one day. The compromise, 

 by which wages are maintained constant for all during a long 

 period, flies in the face of natural laws and may make bad worse, 

 but the complete time-labour system enforces no unreal con- 

 stancy ; the labour-market under that system might fluctuate 

 day by day and although each unit might be engaged for a year, 

 it would be bought at its true value on the day of sale. 



Two seemingly contradictory objections may be made. 1st, 

 that the plan diminishes the power of the workman by mitigating 

 the pressure which a sudden strike inflicts : 2nd, that it dimin- 

 ishes the power of the masters by mitigating the pressure which 

 a lock-out inflicts. Both objections are well founded ; the new 

 plan would mitigate evils which neither side has any right to 

 inflict on the other, and which can not be justly inflicted on the 

 community by traders in any commodity ; but while the suffer- 

 ing inflicted by strikes and lock-outs would be mitigated and 

 indeed perhaps abolished, the legitimate objects of these opera- 

 tions would be attained more perfectly. Wages would rise rapidly 

 and certainly when trade was good ; they would fall gradually 

 but certainly when trade was bad, and in all states of trade the 

 maximum number of men would be employed that could be 

 properly employed profitably both to masters and men. This is 

 not the case under the present convulsive system. Wages often 

 remain lower than they ought to be, because no action short of a 

 convulsion can raise them. They often remain higher than they 

 should be for the same reason ; but in this latter case employers 

 retain a much smaller number than they could usefully employ, 

 if wages followed the market. Both employers and workmen 



