154 



conditions for the existence of our memory of sen- 

 sations or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a 

 truism which it is hardly worth while to state so 

 solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply any- 

 thing else, it is obviously erroneous. And if it 

 means, as the context would seem to show it does, 

 that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought 

 or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, 

 inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large 

 part of the subject-matter of thought or of know- 

 ledge, are not sensations. 



More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewer's 

 next piece of psychology. 



" Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of 

 action to which the nervous system ministers : 



"I. That in which impressions received result in appropriate 

 movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as 

 in the cases of injury above given. This is the reflex action of 

 the nervous system. 



" II. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations 

 through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. 

 Sensation. 



" III. That in which impressions received result in sensations 

 which give rise to the observation of sensible objects. Sensible 

 perception. 



* ' IV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to 

 coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex 

 aggregations, according to the laws of the association of sensible 

 perceptions. A ssociation. 



' ' The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, 

 consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere prescntative 

 sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or representative 

 faculty. Such actions minister to and form Instinct. Besides these, 

 we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely : 



