v ME. DARWIN'S CRITICS 155 



"V. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are 

 reflected on by thought, and recognised as our own, and wo 

 ourselves recognised by ourselves as affected and perceiving. 

 Self-consciousness. 



"VI. That in which we reflect upon our sensations or 

 perceptions, and ask what they are, and why they are. Reason. 



' ' These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, 

 performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas imply- 

 ing the use of a reflective representative faculty. Such actions 

 distinguish the intellect or rational faculty. Now, we assert 

 that possession in perfection of all the first four ( preservative) 

 kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last 

 two (representative) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit 

 the truth of the following proposition : 



" Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if we 

 may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying 

 that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case 

 if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet 

 this is the distinction between the instinctive and the intellectual 

 parts of man's nature. 



"As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the 

 first four groups of actions that they may have, so to speak, 

 mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of 

 complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny 

 to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds 

 of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting 

 on their own existences, or of inquiring into the nature of objects 

 and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or 

 know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them 

 reason. The possession of the presentative faculty, as above 

 explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty ; nor 

 does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking 

 the reflective question before mentioned, as to ' what ' and 

 'why.'" (Loc. cit. pp. 67, 68.) 



Sundry points are worthy of notice in this 

 remarkable account of the intellectual powers. In 

 the first place the Reviewer ignores emotion and 



