A Crumb for the " Modern Symposium" 69 



he does not hold, and I speak subject to correc- 

 tion ; but, if my memory serves me, I have more 

 than once heard him in conversation urging this 

 very objection to any materialistic interpretation 

 of evolution. His wonderfully subtle chapter on 

 " The Substance of Mind " 1 contains, as I under- 

 stand it, the same argument ; but it is easy to 

 miss an author's meaning sometimes when the 

 point expounded is so formidably abstract and 

 general. 



Be this as it may, we are not helped much by 

 supposing the germs of mind to have been some- 

 how latent in the primeval nebula. The notion 

 is too vague to be of any use. The only point on 

 which we can be clear is that no mere collocation 

 of material atoms could ever have evolved the 

 phenomena of consciousness. Beyond this we can- 

 not go. We are confronted with an insoluble 

 metaphysical problem. Of the origin of mind we 

 can give no scientific account, but only an histor- 

 ical one. We can say when (i. e., in connection 

 with what material circumstances) mind came 

 upon the scene of evolution ; but we can neither 

 say whence, nor how, nor why. In just the same 



1 Principles of Psychology, second edition, ii. 145-162. [On refer- 

 ring this point to Mr. Spencer, he desires me to add that I am quite 

 correct in my recollection of his conversations and in my interpreta- 

 tion of hi? position.] 



