Chauncey Wriyht. 93 



upon us this assumption. Along with whatever 

 ' else we are taught about ourselves and the world, 

 there comes as part and parcel the ever-repeated 

 lesson that the order of Nature may be relied on. 

 In this sense the belief may be said to be a net 

 result of all our experience. 



But this is by no means an adequate account 

 of the matter. The case has another aspect, to 

 which neither Mr. Mill nor Mr. Wright has done 

 justice. How can the constancy of Nature be 

 said to be proved by experience, when we begin 

 by assuming it in each of the single acts of expe- 

 rience which, taken together, are said to prove 

 it? Does not this look like reasoning in a circle? 

 We are told that the constancy of Nature is proved 

 for us by an unbroken series of experiences, be- 

 ginning with our birth and ending with our death ; 

 and yet not one of this series of experiences can 

 have any validity, or indeed any existence, unless 

 the constancy of Nature be tacitly assumed to 

 begin with. It is the balance, we are told, which 

 assures us that no particle of matter is ever lost ; 

 but in weighing things in a .balance we must take 

 it for granted that the earth's gravitative force is 

 uniform, is not one thing to-day and another 

 to-morrow ; nay, we must also assume that the 

 present testimony of our senses will continue to 



