132 Darwinism and Other Essays. 



of philosophy beside the older names " idealism " 

 and u scepticism," as indicating a distinct and im- 

 portant phase in the development of speculative 

 thought. But its more recent introduction into 

 philosophic language has not availed to protect it 

 from those ambiguities of interpretation which 

 envelop, as with a halo, the latter time-honoured 

 appellations. On the contrary, so far are most 

 persons from having a distinct idea of what they 

 mean when they speak of positivism that it is 

 not uncommon to hear classed as positivists men 

 like Professors Tyndall and Huxley, the peculiar 

 tendency of whose opinions has been but slightly, 

 if at all, determined by the speculations of M. 

 Comte. To call these men positivists is to neces- 

 sitate such an extension of the term as to include 

 all truly scientific investigators of phenomena, 

 from the days of Galileo and Newton downwards. 

 This vagueness results naturally from the circum- 

 stance that many of M. Comte's most prominent 

 doctrines did not originate with himself, but were 

 held by him in common with many thinkers, both 

 of the present and of past ages. Not only as a 

 discoverer of new truths, but as an organizer of 

 those already discovered, did he announce himself 

 to the world. 



At the present time, when such a general inter- 



