174 Dartvinism and Other Essays. 



will not bear a critical analysis. We have 

 throughout, however, used the expression " moral 

 truths " as equivalent to " truths relating to 

 moral subjects," and the expression " intellectual 

 truths " as equivalent to " truths relating to all 

 other subjects : " and this is admissible, because 

 it gives the meaning intended by the author. 

 We have then shown : first, that intellectual 

 truths are as fixed and unchangeable as moral 

 truths ; secondly, that the interpretation put upon 

 moral truths is even less constant than that put 

 upon intellectual truths ; thirdly, that moral 

 truths receive additions, no less than intellectual 

 truths ; fourthly, that the fact that moral truths 

 receive fewer additions than intellectual truths is 

 of no logical value, because it compares one class 

 of truths with several ; and fifthly, that the cir- 

 cumstance that moral science advances with a 

 slower pace than the other sciences shows only 

 that it is more complex than they are, but does 

 not warrant us in assuming that it is radically 

 different from them. Reviewing our conclusions 

 in this compact form, we see that moral truths 

 come under the same category as intellectual 

 truths, throughout. This confirms what we said 

 at the outset, that there is no such difference be- 

 tween them as Mr. Buckle supposes, and that 



