^6 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



come to treat of the latter, can we be altogether dis- 

 pensed from reverting occasionally to questions about 

 mental states and processes. 



Although he does not treat of "self-consciousness" 

 till he comes to his tenth chapter, yet in a summary 

 which he gives of his first four chapters he speaks * of it 

 as the faculty "whereby the mind is able, as it were, 

 to stand apart from itself, to render one of its states 

 objective to others, f and thus to contemplate its own 

 ideas as such." Now, we should very much like to 

 know what are " the other states " which thus examine 

 *' the one," and what is " the one " which has thus the 

 power of passing the "ideas " in review .-* Surely, at the 

 beginning of a treatise on psychological analysis and 

 classification, it is imperatively necessary to try and 

 make the reader understand the fundamental facts 

 and principles upon which his classification reposes, and 

 how and why it is that what is represented as being 

 such a passive abstraction as a mere " state," should be 

 credited with action and searching power of a " faculty." 



Mr. Romanes expressly repudiates such questions on 

 the ground that they are " quite alien to the scope " of 

 his work. We, on our part, think we have good ground 

 to complain of such repudiation, seeing that Mr. 

 Romanes expressly adopts a very distinct philosophical 

 system. He could not give to the psychical states he 

 describes even the appearance of a transitional character 

 from " sense " to " intellect," but that he starts by 

 assuming the system of Locke. To affirm that system, 

 however, is to affirm that every group of faint, or revived, 

 * p. 397- t The italics are ours. 



