42 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to 

 enlarge them by any kind of abstraction." Here again 

 we have a passage which, if allowed to pass unchal- 

 lenged, would provide all the materials most essential 

 to construct such a temple of error as Mr. Romanes has, 

 in our opinion, reared. We affirm that no brute gives 

 evidence that it possesses any " idea," any power of 

 " abstraction," or any faculty of " reasoning ; " as also 

 that our " ideas " are not formed by the compounding 

 or enlargement of anything which we have in common 

 with the brutes. None the less, we not only most freely 

 allow, but we positively affirm, that brutes possess com- 

 plex groups of associated sensations and emotions ; * 

 that, in their way, they can apprehend not only indi- 

 vidual creatures, but kinds of creatures, and, by their 

 feelings and resulting actions, can draw what may be 

 called "practical inferences." That by this we mean 

 something very different from what Mr. Romanes means, 

 is shown by our utterly different positions as regards 

 the relations of the human intellect. 



Our own meaning we will do our best, as we pro- 

 ceed, to make perfectly clear. Mr. Romanes begins- by 

 observing,t "Psychologists are agreed that what they 



* This is, indeed, all that Mr. Herbert Spencer would allow to 

 man. His " Psychology," upon which his whole philosophy reposes 

 (as he himself declares), is one continued endeavour to resolve 

 our higher faculties into our lower by ignoring intellect altogether. 

 Mr. Romanes is, we believe, a devout and faithful disciple of Mr. 

 Herbert Spencer, and it is, of course, easy enough to derive man's 

 highest faculties from his lower, if by the former be understood (as 

 Mr. H. Spencer understands) nothing but certain groups of his 

 lower faculties. 



t p. 22. 



