MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 45 



as "sensuous universals" from true " universals," and 

 pointed out how utterly distinct they are in nature from 

 " ideas." That the idea of any object — e.g.^ a horse — is 

 not a mere amalgam of modified imaginations, or a 

 generalized mental image, is plain from the fact that the 

 imaginations which have helped to call it forth may per- 

 sist in the mind side by side with it, which they evidently 

 could never do if the idea was made up of such imagi- 

 nations. Neither can our idea of a horse be an 

 imagination generated by antecedent impressions and 

 imaginations, for the notions implicitly contained within 

 it show it to be something of an altogether different 

 kind. The notions we refer to are those of " existence," 

 "similarity," "distinction," "unity," "truth," "materi- 

 ality," "life," and "animal existence of a certain kind." 

 Such things are beyond the domain of the senses, and 

 cannot be contained in any mere images or sense- 

 impressions. For a proof that these notions are 

 really contained in the idea, the reader is referred 

 to our previous work, wherein the fundamental differ- 

 ences between " ideas " and " groups of feelings " are 

 more fully drawn out — in a way which cannot here 

 be repeated at length for lack of space. We claim 

 to have shown that ideas differ from such feelings 

 by their simplicity ; * by the same idea being capable 

 of elicitation by different senses,t while different ideas 

 may accompany a single set of sensations. Ideas are 

 abstract, t reflective, § and self-perceptive, while they 

 cannot be too intense. Ideas may remain the same, 



* See " On Truth," p. io6. t Ibid., pp. 107, 116. 



X Ibid, pp. 207, 212. § Ibid., pp. 207, 216. 



