46 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



while the sensations which accompany them change.* 

 They are apprehensions of abstract qualities grouped 

 round a unity, t and can perceive the " whatness " of 

 things. X Ideas are not tied down to sense and imagi- 

 nation, § but can exceed sensuous experience, || while 

 they can perceive existence, which sense cannot. IT 

 There is one idea, *' being," at the root of all,** while 

 there is no corresponding one fundamental sensation. 

 Ideas are relatively multitudinous ft compared with 

 sensations. Sensations become associated according to 

 the proximity in place or time of their occurrence, but 

 ideas may be associated according to their logical 

 relations.Jt The intellect, unlike feeling, can recognize 

 the truth, goodness, beauty, or objective necessity of its 

 acts,§§ as well as its own supremacy,!! II while it can 

 recognize itself as the energy of a unity ITIF which is 

 essentially inorganic.*** 



It has been said that ideas are only groups of 

 feelings to which names have been assigned, and that 

 the only unity and distinctness about them is the unity 

 and distinctness of the name. " A name," it is objected, 

 "is of course very different from a group of feelings, 

 but there is nothing which is one and distinct, beyond 

 such feelings, save only the word or name." This 

 objection we have already met,ttt and have shown that 

 mental conceptions are both logically and historically 



* See " On Truth," p. io6. f Ibid., p. 207. 



X Ibid., p. 211. § Ibid., pp. 89-101. 



II Ibid., pp. 109, no, 217. 1 Ibid., p. 208. 



** Ibid., p. 209. tt Ibid., p. 210. %% Ibid., p. 217. 



§§ Ibid., p. 217. nil Ibid., p. 113. tIF Ibid., p. 387. 



*** Ibid., pp. 317, 388. ttt Ibid., pp. 224-234. 



