50 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON, 



its glandular hairs are similarly discriminating. We, 

 however, do not attribute even sensation to these plants 

 on the strength of their economical, practically pur- 

 posive, actions. Neither do we attribute to the higher 

 animals the possession of the ideas " Good-for-eating," 

 or " Not-good-for-eating " on the strength of those un- 

 conscious, instinctive actions of theirs which have a 

 superficial resemblance to our acts of intellectual, volun- 

 tary discrimination. Not only the "higher animals," 

 but very lowly animals also, possess multitudes of 

 complex associations of feelings and motions. Amongst 

 them are associations of definite pleasant odours as 

 preceding definite and corresponding savours, as well as 

 associations between various affections of sight and 

 touch and similar pleasant savours. What, then, is 

 more to be expected than that when a group of 

 previously unexperienced sensations are brought before 

 an animal (the new object submitted to the animal's 

 senses) such commonly habitual actions as smelling it, 

 feeling it, and looking round it, should automatically 

 take place.? Thus, instead of saying, "When we see 

 animals determining between similar alternatives by" 

 actions externally like our own, " we cannot reasonably 

 doubt that the psychological processes are similar," we 

 should express ourselves as follows : " Knowing by 

 the widest inductions that we and brute animals are 

 fundamentally different in nature, we should expect 

 a priori that actions externally similar were due to 

 causes internally diverse." Mr. Romanes says, "If I 

 see a fox prowling about a farm-yard, I infer that he 

 has been led by hunger to go where he has a general 



