MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 51 



idea that there are a good many eatable things to be 

 fallen in with — ^just as I myself am led by a similar 

 impulse to visit a restaurant." We should say, " The fox 

 has been led by hunger to visit a place presenting 

 appearances and giving forth odours which have become 

 associated in its sensitive faculty with pleasant con- 

 sequences on previous occasions." We not only concede, 

 but affirm that even very lowly animals have sensuous 

 cognitions and sense perceptions of the kinds of creatures 

 on which they prey, or which may be their enemies. 

 But such affections need not be (and the general out- 

 come of their psychical faculties forbids, them to be) 

 more than those " sensuous universals " before referred 

 to, which are fundamentally and utterly different in 

 nature from the very lowest kind of ideas. 



We have elsewhere * taken all the pains we could to 

 draw out distinctly and fully, to the best of our ability, 

 the distinction between those lower psychical faculties 

 which we evidently share with brutes, and those intel- 

 lectual powers in which we are convinced they have no 

 share. We have shown how, merely by means of 

 associated feelings, such sense-perceptions, sensuous 

 general cognitions, and sensuous inferences may take 

 place even in us, quite apart from true perceptions, 

 general ideas, and inferences. 



With, this reference we must pass on to what we 

 have lately said Mr. Romanes next treats of — namely, 

 the process of " abstraction." 



The power of abstraction, he tells us,t depends on 



* See " On Truth," chaps, xiv., xv., pp. 178-223, 

 t p. 30- 



