54 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



of very different " feelings." A triangle can be appre- 

 hended by means of sight, by feeling, or by hearing its 

 description ; and the general conception, " triangle," can 

 be also understood to be one and the same by means of 

 sight and feeling, or by means of feeling and hearing, 

 or by hearing and sight. The more abstract idea, 

 " extension," may exist apart from sensations of sight, 

 for it exists for the blind. It can exist apart from 

 sensations of touch or of muscular effort, for it may be 

 revealed by sight alone.* 



Mr. Romanes saysf that if the term "abstraction" 

 be confined to what is marked by a name, "then un- 

 doubtedly animals differ from men in not presenting 

 the faculty of abstraction ; for this is no more than to 

 say that animals have not the faculty of speech. But 

 if the term be not thus limited . . . then, no less 

 undoubtedly, animals resemble men in presenting the 

 faculty of abstraction. . . . In accordance with the latter 

 view, great as may be the importance of affixing a name 

 to a compound of simple ideas for the purpose of giving 

 that compound greater clearness and stability, the essence 

 of abstraction 'consists in the act of compounding, or in 

 the blending together of particular ideas into a general 

 idea of the class to which the individual things belong." 



But "abstraction" is not in any way a "blending" 

 or " compounding," but is an ideal separation, or separate 

 intellectual apprehension, of qualities and conditions 

 which actually exist in concrete realities.:|: 



Mr. Romanes does not seem to regard it as possible 



* " On Truth," p. io6. f pp. 32, 2>Z' 



X See " On Truth," pp. 211-216. 



