MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 55 



to deny that " abstraction consists in the compounding 

 of simple ideas," with which inane notion he, mirabile 

 dictu^ credits * both of the two psychological schools he 

 is dealing with. The classification of psychical states 

 he draws out for us is, therefore, as might be expected, 

 confused, misleading, and with cross-divisions, as we 

 will endeavour briefly to point out. 



He submits his classification as follows : — 

 " The word * idea ' I will use ... as a generic term 

 to signify indifferently any product of the imagination, 

 from the mere memory of a sensuous impression up to 

 the result of the most abstruse generalization." This is, 

 indeed, for him a convenient confusion in one lump, of 

 things essentially distinct. Were it once conceded that 

 no difference of kind exists between the sensuous 

 memory of an impression and a really intellectual 

 generalization, it would be altogether idle to inquire 

 whether any difference of kind exists between the 

 psychical natures of man and brute. A concession of 

 the sort would render it impossible for any one whose 

 reasoning powers were not exceptionally defective, to 

 maintain the existence of such a distinction of kind. 



He next tells us, " By * Simple Idea,' * Particular Idea,' 

 or * Concrete Idea,' I understand the mere memory of a 

 particular sensuous perception." But what sort of 

 " memory " is here meant .'* There is true memory, in 

 which we are conscious our recollection refers to the 

 past, and there is the exercise of that retentive faculty 

 which recalls past images without intellectual advert- 

 ence to them. The latter is only improperly called 



* P- 34. 



