56 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



memory, and is to be distinguished as " reminiscence " 

 or " sensuous memory." * It is evident, however, from 

 the connection in which it is used, that Mr. Romanes 

 only refers to sensuous memory ; but the sentence is 

 exceedingly ambiguous. 



" By * Cornpound Idea,' ' Complex Idea,' or ' Mixed 

 Idea,' " he tells us, " I understand the combination 

 of simple, particular, or concrete ideas into that kind 

 of composite idea which is possible without the aid of 

 language." Now, both sensuous and intellectual cogni- 

 tions are possible without the aid of language ; but 

 again the context shows us that Mr. 'Romanes here 

 really intends to denote only what he, a little further 

 on,t calls " Recepts," which are what we have distin- 

 guished as ^' sensuous cognitions," and which may and 

 obviously do exist both in animals and in ourselves. 



Lastly, he informs us, " By ' General Idea,' ' Abstract 

 Idea,' * Concept,' or ' Notion,' I understand that kind of 

 composite idea which is rendered possible only by the 

 aid of language, or by the process of naming abstractions 

 as abstractions." Against this we must once more, in 

 passing, briefly protest, and affirm that general ideas or 

 concepts are not composite, but simple, and that they 

 do not depend for their existence on language. 



* The subject of memory is most important to any one who 

 would investigate the psychology of man and animals. We must 

 refer the reader to our work " On Truth," the second chapter of 

 which is devoted to the faculty of memory generally, while sensuous 

 and intellectual memory are described at pp. i86 and 220 respec- 

 tively. That curious power of mere " organic reminiscence," 

 which has most improperly been spoken of as memory, is treated 

 of at p. 169. 



t p. 36. 



