MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 59 



the term general in naming his intermediate class, and 

 he sums up as follows : — 



! General, Abstract, or Notional = Concepts. 

 Complex, Compound, or Mixed = Recepts, or Generic 

 Ideas. 

 Simple, Particular, or Concrete = Memories of Percepts. 



In order to make clear the precise divergence of view 



which exists between Mr. Romanes * and ourselves, we 



subjoin a tabular statement of corresponding subdivisions 



which may respectively be made in the two groups of 



activities w^hich we regard as fundamentally distinct in 



kind — namely, intellectual perceptions and sensuous 



cognitive affections. To one group of the latter we have 



applied the new term " sencept," for which we feel much 



apology is due. We have used it as conveniently 



matching with Mr. Romanes's term "recept," and as 



serving to distinguish one simple set of affections from 



those which we ourselves term "sensuous universals," 



but which we have no objection to denote by the term 



which Mr. Romanes has himself coined : — 



TDFAc: i General, or true Universals = Concepts. 

 \ Particular or individual = Percepts. 



/Groups of actual experiences \ = Sensuous Uni- 



SENSUOUS * combined with sensuous) versals, or Re- 



COGNITIVE { reminiscences ) cepts. 



AFFECTIONS f Groups of simply juxtaposed \ = Sense - percep - 



^ actual experiences ! tions, or Sen- 



) cepts. 



In his third chapter Mr. Romanes reviews what he 



* In his chapter ix., pp. 184, 185 (on Speech), he further dis- 

 tinguishes between (i) lower and (2) higher recepts, as well as be- 

 tween (3) lower and (4) higher concepts — distinctions which further 

 aid his attempt to bridge over the gulf which yawns between sense 

 and intellect. 



