MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES, 6t 



ing, imaging, or feeling, at the time we exercise them. 

 We are only conscious of the effects of our faculties of 

 instinct and habit. It results from this that we cannot 

 imagine a faculty of instinct or a faculty of habit, for we 

 can never imagine anything of which we have not had 

 experience. Therefore, although our reason tells us 

 that these faculties not only exist but have acted in us, 

 they nevertheless seem to possess a specially mysterious 

 character. Thus it is that we come to feel a temptation 

 not to believe that there are any such special faculties 

 at all. But groups of feelings and thoughts, on the 

 other hand, can be most easily imagined because they 

 are constantly experienced, and this alone would suffice 

 to prevent our feeling any temptation to doubt the 

 existence of our sensitive and cognitive faculties, which 

 would seem to be even more absurd (though it is not 

 really so) than is a doubt as to our own continued, 

 substantial existence. 



(4) We may, then, well expect to find that animals 

 possess powers which we cannot imagine, and in the 

 existence of which, therefore, we may find it difficult 

 to believe. Such are some of the truly marvellous 

 instinctive faculties of insects and other lowly organisms, 

 and the seemingly intelligent powers of some plants.* 

 But these various faculties are no more really won- 

 derful than are our powers of sensation (which are 

 quite as inexplicable), and are vastly less wonderful 

 than are our amazing powers of cognition — especially 

 our knowledge of necessary and universal truths. 



(5) We should carefully distinguish between direct 



* See''OnTruth,»pp. 334, 335. 



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