62 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



and reflex cognition. Even in ourselves, who possess 

 true intellect, we may often, by reflection, detect the 

 past, latent presence of feelings which were not per- 

 ceived. We do not mean by this that we have appre- 

 hended something without adverting to our apprehension. 

 That is a thing we constantly do. It is very rarely that 

 we perceive, or advert to the fact that we are thinking 

 whatever we may happen to be thinking. What we 

 mean is that we can perceive that we had a sense- 

 perception of an object without knowing the object — 

 a sense-perception without consciousness,* as when 

 walking along in a town we suddenly recollect we have 

 seen a name over a shop-window sometime before. 



• Such an impression cannot be a "percept," which is 

 a state the existence of which implies consciousness.! 

 Instead, then, of " percept " and " perception," I, for this, 

 shall venture to employ the terms " sencept " and " sen- 

 ception." Surely in animals which give us no evidence 

 of reflective power, or, as we shall see, of the presence 

 of" consciousness " as distinguished from " consentience," 

 we should expect to be able to account for the most 

 seemingly intelligent actions of animals by " sencepts " 

 and " recepts " (and we ought to do so if we could), 

 without supposing the existence in them of "percepts" 

 and " concepts," which, if they existed, would certainly 

 produce very startling effects which we do not see. By 

 " consentience " \ we mean the faculty of receiving divers 



* See " On Truth," pp. 89, 187. 



t To call any "thing not perceived" a percept — that is, a "thing 

 perceived " — is a glaring contradiction in terms. 



% See " On Truth," pp. 183, 219, 354. As to such an "internal 

 sense," see also above, p. 44, note f. 



