6+ THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



(7) We have already indicated what we deem to be 

 the true nature of the process of abstraction ; but before 

 entering upon a consideration of the statements made 

 by Mr. Romanes in his second chapter, it may be well, 

 at the risk of tediousness, to repeat that so far from its 

 being a separation and segregation of feelings, it is 

 radically different from every sensuous process. It is 

 the spontaneous starting forth in the mind of an intel- 

 lectual cognition, or idea (upon the reception of certain 

 sensuous experiences), like Minerva from the head of 

 Jove. One of the earliest of our abstractions is also one 

 of the most ultimate — namely, the idea of "being." 

 This never was and never could have been a feeling, 

 though the idea must have accompanied every feeling 

 recognized by us as such. Thus abstraction is so 

 fundamentally different from the power of forming 

 sensuous universals, that it may be said to be a process 

 directly contrary to it ; since the latter agglutinates 

 sense-impressions which the former discards as it 

 emerges and escapes from amongst them. 



(8) Lastly, we should be very careful to distinguish 

 between feeling, knowing, judging, inferring, and classi- 

 fying /^r;/^<3;//j/ — i,e, when we perform this act with a dis- 

 tinct intention to perform them — and feeling, knowing, 

 judging, inferring, and classifying materially — i.e. when 

 we do so in a more or less automatic manner, without 

 intention or advertence. This distinction takes note of 

 the difference between direct and reflex cognition.t 



* See " On Truth," pp. 205, 208, 234. 



t As to this, see "On Truth," pp. 8, 23, and also p. 189 as to 

 the three senses of the word " know." 



