MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 65 



Thus there may be — 



{a) Unconscious, merely sensuous cognition, accom- 

 panied by " consentience " — as in the actions of certain 

 sleep-walkers and idiots. 



{b) Intellectual cognition of the lowest order : where 

 general consciousness is present, but where there is no 

 distinct consciousness, not only as to the nature of an 

 act performed, but even as to the fact of its perform- 

 ance ; so that the act is far indeed from being one done 

 with a deliberate intention of doing it. Thus, when out 

 shooting, and in a normal state of consciousness, on 

 firing and missing our aim, we may make some sudden 

 gesture by which a bystander can see what has hap- 

 pened, though we had no intention of so indicating it, 

 and had no distinct consciousness of the fact of our 

 bodily movement. Such a movement is no true "sign," 

 for the gesticulator has no intention of conveying his 

 ideas to another by depicting any fact. If, then, a 

 spectator exclaims, "That gesture is a sign he has 

 missed his aim," such a spectator uses the term " sign " 

 improperly, by a loose analogy. Similarly we may, 

 without any intention or distinct consciousness, make 

 a movement from which a bystander can tell in which 

 direction an animal we have been watching may have 

 gone. 



{c) Intellectual cognition, accompanied not only with 

 a general consciousness, but with a consciousness of an 

 act performed, yet without special advertence to it as. 

 being a fact or to any intention we may have had on 

 performing it. Thus we may suddenly raise our arm 

 and point in a specially selected direction, with the 



F 



