66 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



intention of showing which way any creature has gone. 

 Evidently a consciousness must attend a gesture thus 

 made to indicate direction which was absent in an 

 aimless, altogether unintentional movement produced 

 by vexation at having made a bad shot, however practi- 

 cally indicative the latter may have been. Therefore 

 such a movement is a true " sign," being a movement 

 made depicting a fact with the intention of conveying 

 to other minds the ideas of the sign-maker. 



{d) We may do the same thing not only with con- 

 sciousness and intention, but with express advertence 

 to the fact of our intention in the act deliberately 

 performed. 



We may know without adverting to our knowledge, 

 and we may feel without knowing that we feel. Now, 

 since such is the case with us, it must be, to say the 

 least, probable that animals also may feel without 

 knowing it. 



With these premisses, we may proceed to the ex- 

 amination of Mr. Romanes's third chapter, entitled, 

 " Logic of Recepts." Therein he tells us,* " The ques- 

 tion which we have to consider is whether there is a dif- 

 ference of kind, or only a difference of degree, between 

 a recept and a concept. This is really the question with 

 which the whole of the present volume is concerned." 



We call attention to this passage as an excuse for, 

 and a justification of, what we fear some of our readers 

 may deem too great minuteness and reiteration in this 

 analysis of mental states. Great care is, however, 

 necessary not to yield to the temptation of hurrying 



* P- 45. 



