68 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



things, "notji:;" but this maybe a mere unimportant 

 accident of such mental process. Yet even a mental pro- 

 cess as adaptive as is the determination to bolt, and 

 the bolting of, a bedroom door, cannot be properly said 

 to consist of a discrimination ; although, of course, it is 

 " accompanied " by a formal mental distinction between 

 "doors bolted" and "doors unbolted," and by the 

 material distinction of adding one to the group of " doors 

 actually bolted." Mr. Romanes goes on to say, " An act 

 of simple perception is an act of noticing resemblances 

 and differences between the objects of such perception." 

 But such an act by no means consists in taking notice 

 of qualities, but in perceiving an object by means of 

 the impressions it makes on the senses, which impres- 

 sions (and the qualities they imply) have their effect 

 without being adverted to. They hide themselves in 

 making the object itself known.* The impressions 

 and the resemblances and differences with which they 

 correspond, cannot themselves be noticed without a dis- 

 tinct reflex act. 



Still more objectionable is Mr. Romanes's next sen- 

 tence : " Similarly, an act of conception is the taking 

 together — or the intentional putting together — of ideas 

 which are recognized as analogous," To this we reply, 

 A thousand times. No! A mental act of "concep- 

 tion " does not take place in a way similar to that in 

 which an act of sensuous perception takes place ; which 

 latter, as we have seen, Mr. Romanes includes under 

 his term " percepts." Neither is conception a " taking 

 together," and still less is it an " intentional putting 

 * See " On Truth," pp. 91, 96, loi. 



