MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 69 



together " of ideas in any sense — and a fortiori not in 

 the sense in which Mr. Romanes uses that much abused 

 word.* There need be no " recognition " of any analogy 

 existing between objects in order that a concept should 

 be formed. Men can form a concept of the sun who do 

 not know, or suspect, that any other sun exists. Even in 

 the commonest cases, as in the concept " apple," we by 

 no means need to advert to or " recognize " an analogy 

 existing between different kinds of apples or different 

 specimens of one kind of apple, though, of course, we 

 can turn back our minds and, by reflection, " recognize " 

 such analogy. All that is necessary is that there be such 

 a direct apprehension of an object, as an object of a 

 kind and possessing qualities or existing in one of vari- 

 ous states ; but there need be no advertence either to 

 the qualities or states, which are, nevertheless, implicitly 

 apprehended in every direct perception and conception. 

 But, putting aside the sensuous meanings which Mr. 

 Romanes attaches to the term " idea," and taking it in 

 the sense of a truly intellectual act of perception, even 

 then a " conception " is not " a taking together " of 

 such ideas, though it may be elicited through our ap- 

 prehension of different ideas. Thus our conception of 

 the idea, " a marsupial mammal," may be elicited by our 

 acquisition of ideas concerning the structural and physio- 

 logical characters, and the environing conditions of the 

 existing and extinct animals belonging to the zoological 

 order, Marsupialia. Yet the idea itself is one single idea. 



■^ Namely, in the sense of " any product of imagination, from 

 the mere memory of a sensuous impression up to the results of the 

 most abstruse generalization " (p. 34). 



