70 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



The matter in which we deem Mr. Romanes most 

 mistaken is his notion that an "intentional" putting 

 together of ideas is a necessary preliminary to our form- 

 ing any mental conception. The infant who sees one 

 or several dogs, does not fulfil any mental intention 

 when it forms its corresponding concept. Neither do 

 the first observers of an object new to them, intentionally 

 put together ideas and group them into a plexus ; but 

 their mental experiences give rise to a spontaneously 

 formed new intellectual product or concept — which 

 may be very imperfect and inadequate, but which is a 

 concept notwithstanding. 



Mr. Romanes continues:* " Hence abstraction has 

 to do with the abstracting of analogous qualities." The 

 expression, ** has to do with," is an exceedingly vague 

 one, and Mr. Romanes's meaning in using it is conse- 

 quently obscure. We will not, therefore, further criticize 

 it, contenting ourselves with once more observing that 

 abstraction is much more than "the abstracting of 

 analogous qualities," as most notably of all in the 

 formation of that highest abstraction, the idea of 

 ** being." 



" Reason," our author tells us, " is ratiocination, or 

 the comparison of ratios." In saying this he further 

 shows himself to be a disciple of Mr. Herbert Spencer, 

 and errs with him. " Reason " is not equivalent to 

 " ratiocination." It is a wider term, which includes 

 inference, or ratiocination, but is by no means confined 

 to it ; for it also includes " intellectual intuition." f 



It is by our reason, but certainly not by any process 

 * p. 46. t As to this, see further, " On Truth," p. 220. 



