MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 71 



of inference^ we see that nothing can both be and not 

 be at the same time, or that we know we have any 

 feeling which we may have at the time. That ratiocina- 

 tion cannot be the whole of our reason, or even the 

 most important part of it, is evident. For all proof, or 

 reasoning, must ultimately rest upon truths which carry 

 with them their own evidence, and do not, therefore, 

 need proof. Consequently, the most important, because 

 ultimate, department of our reason must be that which 

 apprehends such self-evident, necessary truths. But 

 inference, or ratiocination itself, is not a comparison of 

 ratios. It is the process of making latent and implicit 

 truth into explicitly recognized truth, in an orderly 

 manner, according to the laws of thought — that is, 

 according to logic* Denying, therefore, in toto Mr. 

 Romanes's assertion of the similarity of nature between 

 sensuous and intellectual perception, and between re- 

 cepts and concepts, we none the less freely let pass, 

 without objection, his term " logic of recepts," not only 

 allowing, but strenuously affirming, that the sensitive, 

 imaginative, and associative power of living organisms 

 has its own innate orderly laws, according to which all 

 their feelings, imaginations, and sense-perceptions take 

 place. For the very same reason, however, we cannot 

 agree with Mr. Romanes in objecting f to the terms 

 " Logic of Feelings " and " Logic of Signs." For the 

 fact that Feelings belong to the sensitive and emotional 

 side of life, is no reason why they should not occur, 

 and group themselves according to their own laws. 

 ** Signs," it is true, are the expression of psychical con- 

 * See " On Truth," chap, v., On Reasoning. f P- 47- 



