MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 77 



observes, 'Animals, like ourselves, are forced to make 

 abstractions. A dog . which has lost its master, runs 

 towards a group of men, by virtue of a general abstract 

 idea, which represents to him the qualities possessed in 

 common with these men by his master." But the dog 

 runs towards the men because the sense-impressions it has 

 received from them raise pleasurable feelings of antici- 

 pation and of the completion of a sensuous harmony 

 unconsciously craved.* There is no more need for an 

 act of abstraction in this case than there is in the case 

 of a stag which " doubles " on its own footsteps, and 

 sometimes practises before retiring to rest "the artifices 

 which he would have employed to throw out the dogs, 

 if he were pursued by them."' Such actions are clearly 

 " instinctive proceedings." Mr. Romanes adds,t "It is 

 remarkable enough that an animal should seek to con- 

 fuse its trail by such devices, even when it knows that 

 the hounds are actually in pursuit ; but it is still more so 

 when the devices are resorted to in order to confuse 

 imaginary hounds which may possibly be on the scent." 

 The fact would be curious indeed if, as the words quoted 

 seem intended to imply, the stag consciously employed 

 such devices as a consequence of thinking that hounds 

 might be on its scent, and formed an intention to de- 

 ceive them accordingly. There is not, however, the 

 slightest need to adopt so absurd a notion. The action 

 is sufficiently accounted for by instinct. It is done 

 instinctively, as a dog instinctively turns round and 



* For further detail as to instances of precisely the same kind, 

 see " On Truth," p. 350. 

 t p. 55- 



