82 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



and to associate a repetition of the same movements 

 more or less frequently with different sounds is an act 

 of essentially the same kind as the former. That the 

 thing seems at all marvellous is due to a trick of our 

 own imagination. The words of command in this case 

 are words which express for us the highly abstract idea 

 of number ; and our imagination having become con- 

 nected therewith, we are apt to picture to ourselves a 

 like connection in the cognitive faculty of the ape. But 

 its presence there is by no means necessary to explain 

 the action, while if such a highly abstract idea was 

 present there, the animal would not allow us to long 

 remain doubtful as to the fact. We particularly 

 questioned its keeper whether the ape ever pointed to 

 any object or used any gesture with the evident purpose 

 of calling his attention to some fact or passing occurrence. 

 Although he was evidently well disposed to extol the 

 powers of his charge as far as truth would permit, he 

 distinctly told us it did not do so. If any one came in 

 with a gun the creature would show extreme terror, but 

 ** Sally " never pointed to it or by gesture called the 

 keeper's own attention to the dreaded object. We could 

 neither see nor hear of anything rendering it possible 

 to attribute to this very interesting brute a psychical 

 nature of a higher kind than that possessed by any other 

 brutes. It appeared to us plainly to have only the 

 same kind of powers with them, although they might 

 be more developed in degree. But this, surely, is just 

 what we should expect. The rational nature of man 

 has been conferred only on an animal of a special kind, 

 with a body resembling very closely that of an ape. 



