MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 83 



We might, then, confidently expect to find in that animal 

 such higher powers of mere sensitivity as should almost 

 fit it to be the receptacle of a higher nature, which 

 higher nature could not evidently act in conformity with 

 its requirements in the body of some very differently 

 constituted beast, such as a horse, an ant-eater, or a 

 whale. The powers and activities possessed by apes 

 and monkeys are just those we should expect to find in 

 animals closely resembling ourselves in body, but devoid 

 of mind. They exhibit phenomena which are those of 

 the life of a mere brute nature, but yet are the pheno- 

 mena of a brute nature the sensitive powers of which 

 are somewhat exceptionally developed, as of a brute 

 nature which had been formed in preparation for and 

 as an adumbration of what was to follow. 



Mr. Romanes objects* — as from the position he takes 

 up he is forced to object — to our declaration (in which 

 we have the advantage of having the great physiologist, 

 Miiller, as well as Hegel, on our side) that the forma- 

 tion of abstract conceptions under the notion of cause 

 and effect, is impossible to animals. He declares f 

 that, in his opinion, "needless obscurity is imported 

 into this matter, by not considering in what our own 

 idea of causality consists. . . . All men and most 

 animals have a generic idea of causality, in the sense 

 of expecting uniform experience under uniform con- 

 ditions." Here the word ''expecting" is used ambigu- 

 ously, and is therefore misleading. To "expect" in 

 the sense of to perceive what may or should follow, is 

 what we utterly deny any brute can do. To "expect," 

 * p. 58 t P- 59. 



