MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 89 



very misleading, and really once more begs the whole 

 question which its author has to prove. He says,* 

 *' The object of this chapter has been to show, first, that 

 the unintentional grouping which is distinctive of re- 

 cepts may be carried to a wonderful pitch of perfection 

 without any aid from the intentional grouping which 

 is distinctive of concepts ; and, second, that from the 

 very beginning conscious ideation [which here means 

 our consentience] has been concerned with grouping. 

 Not only, or not even chiefly, has it had to do with 

 the registration in memory of particular percepts ; but 

 much more has it had to do with the spontaneous 

 sorting of such percepts, with the spontaneous arrange- 

 ment of them in ideal (or imagery) systems, and, conse- 

 quently, with the spontaneous reflection in consciousness 

 of many among the less complex relations — or the less 

 abstruse principles — which have been uniformly encoun- 

 tered by the mind in its converse with an orderly 

 world." 



Certainly the world is orderly. Certainly its co- 

 existences and sequences make manifest, objective 

 relations and principles which pervade and govern it. 

 Certainly, also, these objective conditions modify the 

 sentiency of irrational organisms, and certainly, as we 

 have elsewhere pointed out,t such objective conditions 

 correspond, as "objective concepts," with internal per- 

 ceptions or " subjective concepts in us." But this in 

 no way even tends (as it is represented as tending) to 

 bridge over the gulf which exists between sentiency and 

 intellect. We might d. priori expect to find a certain 



* p. 69. t See " On Truth," pp. 136, 137, 386, 445. 



