MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. 93 



bility," and "truth," etc., are latent and implied.* But 

 such is not the case with recepts, every one of which, 

 moreover, not only contains, but consists of, phantasmata 

 — imaginary phenomena which accompany, but are far 

 indeed from constituting, every concept. 



Mr. Romanes offers us, as examples of recepts (sense- 

 perceptions), the impressions severally produced by 

 water, ice, or dry land, on the psychical faculties of 

 diving birds and men. Man, he tells us,t "like the 

 water-fowl, has two distinct recepts, one of which answers 

 to solid ground, and the other to an unresisting fluid. 

 But, unlike the water-fowl, he is able to bestow upon 

 each of these recepts a name, and thus to raise them 

 both to the level of concepts." But it is his very power 

 of conception which enables him to give them a name. 

 No concepts, therefore, can possibly be " merely the 

 name of recepts ; " they are results of, and embody that 

 marvellous power which enables man to bestow a name. 



Man, he tells us, " must be able to set his recept 

 before his own mind as an object of his own thought : 

 before he can bestow upon these generic ideas the names 

 of * solid ' and ' fluid,' he must have cognized them as 

 ideas." Here there is some confusion of thought. We 

 do not bestow names upon our sensuous cognitions or 

 recepts, unless we are occupied about psychology — unless 

 we are considering mental processes. But we bestow 

 names upon what we perceive to be objects of certain 

 kinds, or upon qualities which we perceive concretely 

 existing, as, e.g.^ in this land or that water. We do not 

 perceive the various groups of sensuous affections we 



* See " On Truth," pp. 103-105. t P- 74- 



