94 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



experience, as so many ideas — which, indeed, they never 

 were and never will be. What we perceive are so many 

 objective realities, and by turning back the mind to 

 consider our mental experience, we can recognize that 

 the presence of those objective realities has been revealed 

 to our minds by means of the various unnoticed sensa- 

 tions and sense-perceptions, excited in us by them. 

 These sensuous affections, as before said, hide them- 

 selves in making such objects and ideas known. But 

 it is evident that they do not constitute such things, for, 

 as we have pointed out, they persist and remain side 

 by side with the ideas to which they minister. 



Mr. Romanes further says : " Prior to this act of cogni- 

 tion, these ideas [of man] differed in no respect from the 

 recepts of a water-fowl." Now, we do not desire to deny 

 this — the question is for us quite immaterial. Neverthe- 

 less we do not think that such complete similarity can with 

 reason be so dogmatically affirmed. It is by no means 

 clear to us that the recepts formed by different animals 

 from the very same objects must always "differ in no 

 respect." The innate natures of different animals — e.g. 

 birds and fishes — may so differ that the action of the 

 same object on both may produce in those two classes 

 of animals results more or less decidedly different. Mr. 

 Romanes adds,* " In virtue of this act of cognition, 

 whereby he assigns a name to an idea known as such, he 

 [man] has created for himself a priceless possession : he 

 has formed a concept." But our author has previously 

 affirmed, with great truth, that before a man can bestow 

 names, he must have ideally cognized what he so names. 



* p. 75. 



