96 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON 



This statement is founded on a fact which it deforms. 

 It is quite true that we can have no sense-perception 

 without preceding or accompanying sensations, and no 

 idea without some accompanying imaginations ; but the 

 expression, "in their last resort," implies that ideas are 

 fundamentally only recepts. One thing is not another 

 because it cannot exist without it. All active steam- 

 engines depend on water, but they are not water. Simi- 

 larly the teaching contained in Mr. Romanes's book 

 depends on printer's ink and printer's devils, yet it is 

 altogether different from either. 



It is but natural, then, in him to tell us that "the 

 most highly abstract terms are derived from terms less 

 abstract, until, by two or three such steps at the most, 

 we are in all cases led directly back to their origin 

 in a 'lower concept' — i.e. in the name of a recept" 

 This statement is based partly upon the fact that the 

 most abstract terms have had, originally, concrete signi- 

 fications. Indeed, as we shall later on have occasion 

 to point out, we cannot, even if we would, make use of 

 terms which have no concrete meanings. This, how- 

 ever, is no reason why such terms should not also 

 serve to give expression, by analogy, to meanings which 

 are altogether beyond the range of sense-perception.* 

 They are certainly able to do so now, and we think it 

 will by-and-by be made evident that they must always 

 have done so. The idea " equality " is " abstract " 

 enough ; yet deaf-mutes have expressed it by placing 

 their forefingers side by side. Why, then, should the 



* That conception and intellect are not bounded by our sensitive 

 powers, see " On Truth," pp. 109-1 11. 



