MENTAL STATES AND PROCESSES. loi 



fessor Max Miiller rightly declares to be "the inevitable 

 conclusion of Nominalism," he, none the less, very 



ing thinkers and speakers of the world. No reason without 

 language — no language without reason. Try to reckon without 

 numbers, whether spoken, written, or otherwise marked ; and if 

 you succeed in that I shall admit that it is possible to reason or 

 reckon without words, and that there is in us such a thing or such 

 a power or faculty as reason, apart from words. 



" You say I shall never live to see it admitted that man cannot 

 reason without words. This does not discourage me. Through 

 the whole of my life I have cared for truth, not for success. And 

 truth is not our own. We may seek truth, serve truth, love truth ; 

 but truth takes care of herself, and she inspires her true lovers 

 with the same feeling of perfect trust. Those who cannot believe \>^ 

 in themselves, unless they are believed in by others, have never 

 known what truth is. Those who have found truth know best how 

 little it is their work, and how small the merit which they can claim 

 for themselves. They were blind before, and now they can see* 

 That is all. 



" But even if I thought that truth depended on majorities, I 

 believe I might boldly say that the majority of philosophers of all 

 ages and countries is really on my side (see ' Science of Thought,' 

 pp. 31 et seg), though few only have asserted the identity of reason 

 and language without some timorous reserve, still fewer have seen 

 all the consequences that flow from it. 



" Some people seem to resent it almost as a personal insult that 

 what we call our divine reason should be no more than human 

 language, and that the whole of this human language should have 

 been derived from no more than 800 roots, which can be reduced 

 to about 120 concepts. But if I had wished to startle my readers 

 I could easily have shown that out of these 800 roots one-half 

 could really have been dispensed with, and has been dispensed 

 with in modern languages (see ' Science of Thought,' p. 417), while 

 among the 120 concepts not a few are clearly secondary, and owe 

 their place in my list (ib. p. 619) merely to the fact that in Sanskrit 

 they cannot be reduced to any more primitive concept. To dance, 

 for instance, cannot be called a primitive concept ; perhaps not 

 even to hunger, to thirst, to cook, to roast, etc. Only it so happens 

 that in Sanskrit, to which my statistical remarks were restricted, we 

 cannot go behind such roots as N/RT, KSHUDH, T/RSH, VAK, 

 etc. It is in that Hmited sense only that such roots and such 



