112 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



or spoken word " horse." It is an intellectual sign^ the 

 efficiency of which proves the radical independence of 



was more wonderful than what Leibnitz called the algebra of 

 thought. Now, what do M. Binet's experiments prove ? That 

 there are two kinds of images, the consecutive^ reproduced spontane- 

 ously and suddenly, and the 7tie7norial^ connected with an associa- 

 tion of ideas. The consecutive image, a kind of impression avant la 

 lettre, may reappear long after the existing sensation has ceased to 

 act, and it reafppears without any rhyme or reason. But how are 

 the memorial images recalled, seen by people, such as M. Binet 

 describes, in a state of hypnotism .'* Entirely by the word. Show 

 a hypnotized patient her portrait, and she may or may not recognize 

 it. But tell her, in so many words, ' This is your portrait,' and 

 she will see her likeness in a landscape of the Pyrenees (pp. 

 56-57). M. Binet is fully aware of what is implied by this. Thus, 

 on p. 58, he writes, ' H hallucination hypnotique est formde d'un 

 image suggeree par la parole.' So, again, when describing the 

 simplest acts of perception, M. Binet explains how much is added 

 by ourselves to the mere impressions received through the senses 

 by ' ce qu'on croit voir^ by * ce qu'on croit sentir^ and by ' le nom 

 qu^on croit entendre prononcer^ The facts and experiments, there- 

 fore, contained in M. Binet's charming volume seem to me entirely 

 on my side, nor do I see that thoughtful observer has ever denied 

 the necessity of language or signs of some sort for the purpose of 

 reasoning, nay, even of imagination. 



. " I find it difficult to answer all the questions which the Professor 

 has asked, because it would seem hke writing my own book over 

 again. However, I shall confess that I have laid myself open to 

 some just criticism in not renouncing altogether the metaphorical 

 poetry of language. I ought not to have spoken of Truth as a kind 

 of personal being, nor of Reason as a power that governs the uni- 

 verse. But no astronomer is blamed when he uses the old termi- 

 nology of sunrise and sunset ; no biologist is misunderstood when 

 he speaks of mankind ; and no philosopher is denounced when he 

 continues to use the big I instead of ' succession of states of con- 

 sciousness.' If, therefore, I said that I recognized in evolution the 

 triumph of reason, I meant no more than that I could not re- 

 cognize in it the triumph of mere chance. Prof Mivart imagines 

 that I misunderstood what the biologist means by the survival of 

 the fittest. Far from it, I understand that phrase, and decidedly 

 reject it. For, either the survival of the fittest means no more than 



