114 THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN REASON. 



intellect and a body forming one absolute unity (one 

 embodied intelligence), some bodily activity must, as 



directly and others indirectly. Normally, his conceptions clothe 

 themselves in vocal sounds, and get so intimately connected there- 

 with, that the 'word' becomes practically a single thing composed of 

 a mental and an oral element. But these elements are not identical^ 

 and the verbum mentale is anterior and superior to the verbum oris 

 which it should govern and direct. Abnormally, conceptions do 

 not clothe themselves in oral expressions at all, but only in manual 

 or other bodily signs, and this shows that concepts may be ex- 

 pressed (however imperfectly) in the language of gesture without 

 speech. One consequence of these relations is that neither the 

 utterance of sounds (articulate or inarticulate) nor bodily move- 

 ments could have generated the intellect and reason of man, and 

 Noird's hypothesis falls to the ground. On the other hand, beings 

 essentially intellectual, but as yet without language, would immedi- 

 ately clothe their nascent concepts in some forms of bodily ex- 

 pression by means of which they would quickly understand one 

 another. 



" As to the expressions ' reason ' and ' reckoning,' I would 

 observe that a study of an organism's embryonic development is a 

 most valuable clue to its nature, and no doubt a similar utility 

 attends historical investigations in Prof Max Miiller's science. 

 Nevertheless, we cannot understand the nature of an animal or 

 plant by a mere knowledge of an early stage of its existence ; an 

 acquaintance with the outcome of its development is even more 

 important. Similarly, I venture to presume, the ultimate meaning 

 of a word is at least as much its true meaning as is some archaic 

 signification which may have grown obsolete. The word * spirit,' 

 if it once meant only the breath, means more now — as we see from 

 the Professor's first letter. Similarly, if ' reason/ in its Latin form, 

 once only meant ' reckoning,' that is no ' reason ' why it should 

 only mean reckoning now. Here it would seem as if we had an 

 instance of the verbum mentale having acted upon and modified 

 the verbum oris. I cannot but regard the representation that 

 affirmative and negative propositions are mere cases of addition 

 and subtraction, as an incorrect and misleading representation, save 

 when they refer to mathematical conceptions. I am compelled 

 also to object to another of the Professor's assertions. He says, 

 * There is a wide difference between our apprehending our own 

 activity and apprehending that A is A. Apprehending our own 



