REASON AND LANGUAGE. 121 



kinds of written signs which we willingly adopt for 

 greater clearness, and to avoid all divergence which 

 does not seem to us absolutely necessary. 



Of these seven categories we regard the first three as 

 being common to us and to animals, and hold that the 

 last four — as external manifestations of internal intellec- 

 tual conceptions — are absolutely peculiar to mankind.* 



Mr. Romanes begins by saying, f "Now, the first 

 thing to be noticed is, that the signs made may be 

 made either intentionally or unintentionally ; and the 

 next is, that the division of intentional signs may be 

 conveniently subdivided into two classes — namely, in- 

 tentional signs which are natural, and intentional signs 

 which are conventional." 



oaths and exclamations, and the words of certain idiots, who will 

 repeat, without comprehending, every phrase they hear. 



(3) Gestures which do not answer to rational conceptions, but 

 are the bodily signs of pain or pleasure, of passion or emotion. 



Of the language of the intellect we may have — 



(4) Sounds which are rational but not articulate, such as the 

 inarticulate ejaculations by which we sometimes express assent 

 to, or dissent from, given propositions. 



(5) Sounds which are both rational and articulate, constituting 

 true " speech." 



(6) Gestures which give expression to rational conceptions, and 

 are therefore " external " but not " oral " manifestations of abstract 

 thought. Such are many of the gestures of deaf-mutes, who, being 

 incapable of articulating words, have invented or acquired a true 

 gesture-language. 



We will here add — 



(7) A special external manifestation of abstract thought in the 

 form of written or pictorial signs. 



♦ As to language and the fundamental distinction which exists 

 between its emotional and intellectual forms, see further, "On 

 Truth," chap, xvi., pp. 351-355- 



t p. 86. 



